Most attacks are launched inside the companies by the employees of the same company. These kinds of attacks are generally against layer-2, not against layer-3 or IP. These attacks abuse the switch operation at layer-2. One of the attacks of this kind is Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) Spoofing (sometimes it is called ARP poisoning). This attack is classified as the "man in the middle" (MITM) attack. The usual security systems such as (personal) firewalls or virus protection software can not recognize this type of attack. Taping into the communication between two hosts one can access the confidential data. Malicious software to run internal attacks on a network is freely available on the Internet, such as Ettercap.
INTRODUCTION Nowadays Ethernet is the most common protocol used at layer-2 of Local Area Networks (LANs). Ethernet protocol is implemented on the Network Interface Card (NIC). On top of Ethernet, Internet Protocol (IP),
Transmission Control/User Datagram Protocols (TCP/UDP) are employed respectively. In this protocol stack for a packet to reach its destination IP and MAC of destination have to be known by the source. This can be done by ARP which is a protocol running at layer-3 of Open System Interface (OSI) model. ARP is designed without considering security issues like all other TCP/IP protocol stack. Malicious people can use these protocols for their own use.
ARP [1] finds the MAC address of destination computer by using the IP address of destination computer. ARP spoofing forces the destination computer to send packets to the attacker instead of source. Attacker can tap into the communication by forcing source and destination computers to send packets to itself at the same time. When it comes to this situation it is called MITM. In this situation the attacker can read packets of source and destination computers, save them and may change packet content or inject new packets. Figure 1 is showing MITM.
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This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes details of ARP and ARP spoofing. Section 3 describes previous work on the subject and other protection methods. The proposal and its implementation are explained in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 2.1 ARP
ARP is a protocol used in the TCP/IP protocol suite at the internet layer. TCP/IP protocol suite is shown in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2 TCP/IP Protocol Stack
At Ethernet LANs using TCP/IP, address of a computer is determined by <IP, MAC> pair. IP is the 32 bit IPv4 address which is added to packet header. This address is assigned by the network administrator, Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) or owner of the computer as unique in that LAN. Of course if it is directly connected to internet it should be assigned by Internet Service Provider. IP is unique in that LAN.
MAC address is 48 bit LAN interface address of a NIC. Every NIC has a unique MAC address in the World. ARP provides mapping between IP and MAC address. In other words ARP finds the MAC address of the destination computer by using the IP address of the destination computer. If a computer has a packet to send, first it checks the ARP cache. ARP cache is the place where IP and MAC address mappings (<IP, MAC> pairs) are kept for a limited time. ARP cache mappings have aging time. At the end of this aging time <IP, MAC> pairings are flushed from the cache. This is because of dynamic nature of LANs. A new computer can be added or a computer may be shutdown, so it is meaningful that these cache entries have a limited life. If source computer can not find the MAC address of the destination computer, it broadcasts an ARP request packet. Every host on the network receives the request and checks if the IP address in the request is bound to one of its network interfaces. If this is the case, host with the matching IP address sends a unicast reply to the sender of request with its <IP, MAC> pair. This <IP, MAC> pair is entered into the ARP cache for further use. Next time when this host wants to send a packet to the same destination it retrieves the MAC address from the cache thus reducing the broadcast packet count. Figure 3 shows the ARP request/reply packet content.
Figure 3 ARP request/replay packet [2]
Şekil Şekil ARP is stateless protocol, i.e., a reply may be processed even though the corresponding request was never sent. When a host receives a reply, it updates the corresponding entry in the cache with the <IP, MAC> pair in the reply. All possible cases that result cache update as follows:
Solicited entries: A host sends an ARP request and gets the reply. The IP and the MAC of this reply are entered into the cache. These are solicited entries, after a lifetime they are deleted from the cache.
Unsolicited entries: A host can receive an ARP request that is not destined for it, because ARP packets are broadcast. Even though it is not destined for itself, it checks if the sender IP is in the cache, if it is in the cache then it updates MAC of this IP with the new one received. Some ARP implementations may enter this <IP, MAC> pair if not present in the cache as a new entry as contrary to the RFC 826 [1] .
Static entries: These entries are entered manually and they have no lifetime. They live until next reboot. They are not updated by ARP request or reply packets.
Gratuitous ARP:
A gratuitous ARP is a message sent by a host requesting the MAC address for its own IP address. It is sent either by a host that wishes to determine if there is another host on the LAN with the same IP address or by a host announcing that it has changed its MAC address, thus allowing the other hosts to update their caches [3] . Figure 4 shows how ARP works. 
ARP Spoofing
By forging an ARP reply, an attacker may easily change the <IP, MAC> association contained in a host ARP cache. Since each host presumes its local cache to be trustworthy the spoofed host will send IP packets encapsulated into Ethernet frames with a bogus MAC address as destination. This way the attacker may receive all the frames originally directed to some other host. If also the cache of the real destination host is poisoned, both communication flows are under the attacker's control. Figure 5 shows the caches of the spoofed source and destination hosts. The attacker realizes a two-way man in the middle, where he/she can forward the received packets to the correct destination after inspecting and possibly modifying them. The two end points of the connection will not notice the extra hop added by the attacker if the packet TTL is not decremented. Some operating systems, will not update an entry in the cache if such an entry is not already present when an unsolicited ARP reply is received. The attacker can easily circumvent this precaution as follows: The attacker needs to trick the victim into adding a new entry in the cache first, so that a future ARP reply can update it. By sending a forged Internet Message Control Protocol (ICMP) echo request, it replies with an ICMP echo reply, which requires resolving first the IP address of the original ICMP request into an MAC address, thus creating an entry in the cache. The attacker can now update it with an unsolicited ARP reply [3] .
RELATED WORK AND OTHER PREVENTION METHODS
There are some studies made up to now to prevent ARP spoofing. In [4] several studies which were categorized as detection, mitigation, and prevention or blocking were investigated and their advantages and disadvantages were explained. Security companies are also trying to find a solution to this problem.
There are actually two ways of preventing ARP attacks. One is changing the ARP protocol itself, by adding security or completely changing the protocol implementation. Some of these are not backward compatible as in [5] and [6] and some are as in [3] . Because it is possible to change the ARP cache of a host by directly sending an ARP reply packet to that host, without other hosts' noticing, the only way to prevent ARP spoofing without changing ARP protocol is programming the switch. All layer-2 frames are flowed under the control of switches. Second way of resolving ARP attacks is to interact with the switch to get the required information to realize if an ARP packet is an attack or not. Solutions explained in [7] and [8] fall into this category. Additionally these can be monitored and controlled at a central palace. Solution explained in this paper is also in this category.
In the following paragraphs a few of the solutions will be explained in more detail.
ARP-Guard box [7]:
It is a solution of ISL and SECUDOS firms which consists of hardware and software. DOMOS operating system runs on the hardware and the ARP-Guard software runs on this operating system. The ARP-Guard software has also a version which runs on Linux and Windows. ARP-Guard is based on sensors. It uses two sensors, LAN and SNMP sensors. LAN sensor listens to the mirror port of the switch and alarms the management console about ARP spoofing attacks. SNMP sensor is used for to get ARP information from routers. After sensors alert the management console, management console inform network administrator or can take preventive action automatically.
When using ARP-Guard it should be noted that mirror ports may not catch all the packets all the time, it is possible to miss some ARP packets and as a consequence some attacks. SNMP just get the ARP information from router thus if the attacker and the victim are in the same subnet there is no attack detection [8] .
S-ARP (Secure ARP) [3]:
S-ARP is based on digital signing of ARP packets by using public/private key pairs. Any S-ARP enabled host is identified by its own IP address and has public/private key pair. A simple certificate provides the binding between the host identity and its public key. Besides the host public key, the certificate contains the host IP address and the MAC address of the Authoritative Key Distributer (AKD), a trusted host acting as key repository. Each host sends its signed certificate containing the public key and the IP address to the AKD.
Every host maintains a ring of the public keys and the corresponding IP addresses previously requested to the AKD. When a host receives an S-ARP reply, it searches the sender IP address and its corresponding public key in its ring. If it finds such an entry, it uses the content to verify the signature; otherwise it sends a request to the AKD for the certificate. A request to the AKD is sent also in case the key in local ring does not verify the signature, since it may no longer be valid. The AKD sends a signed reply with the requested public key and the current time-stamp. Upon receiving the reply from the AKD, the host stores the public key in its ring and verifies the signature.
A drawback of this scheme is that the AKD constitutes a single point of failure in the network. If the AKD is down, a host can not verify ARP packets that are sent by a previously unknown host. Even if the AKD is working properly, an attacker can impersonate a host that goes down by cloning the MAC address of the host (but only until the cache entry of the host being impersonated, in the host being attacked expires). [4] 
Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS):
IDS/IPSs can be divided as host based and network based. Host based ones are installed on hosts and detect or protect for only those hosts. Network based ones listen to mirror port of the switch or some ports of the switch. They can detect or protect the hosts connected to those ports.
IDSs like Snort [10] are usually able to detect ARP attacks and inform the administrator with the generation of an appropriate alert or alarm. The main problem with IDSs is that they tend to generate a high number of false positives (alarms that turn out to be not part of attacks), that for them to be effective, it becomes a must for the company to put somebody in charge of dealing with these events. For many companies, having to pay somebody to do this job is not an option [4] .
IPSs protect the host or network by sending TCP reset packet to the attacker or they can order switch to stop communication of the attacker.
Static ARP Entries:
As I explained in section 2.1 every host has a ARP cache in which <IP, MAC> pairs are kept for a limited time. If these entries are flushed after an aging time, these are called dynamic entries. On the other hand we can enter data to this cache manually. The data entered manually are called static entries and they have no aging time. An attacker can not change these entries by sending forged ARP replies. Static ARP entries are guarantied solution for ARP spoofing. Although it is the guarantied solution it is very difficult to implement. It is very hard to enter all the hosts <IP, MAC> pairs into all hosts in the network. If you entered once, maintenance of it also were very difficult. Because there always be change of IP addresses and some hosts are added or removed from the network. Furthermore, some operating systems (such as Windows) may accept ARP replies and update for static entries. [11] This solution can be implemented for only limited number of hosts. For example <IP, MAC> pairs of intranet web servers or other important servers or <IP, MAC> pair of the network gateway can be entered manually to all hosts, thus ensuring the one way communication between them.
PROPOSED SOLUTION 4.1 Layer-2 Switch Operation and Filtering
LANs were based on bus topology at first. Later hubs began utilizing star topology. Hubs and bus networks create a common network segment which is shared by all hosts connected to that network. Common network segment creates one big collision domain which reduces network performance and allows a host to listen to other hosts communicating on the network. After hubs, switches were invented. Switch makes micro segmentation which means there is no collision and a host can not listen to other communicating pairs. At first switches were running at OSI layer-2, later layer-3,4 switches were invented.
A switch running at OSI layer-2 is used in this proposal. This switch has the ability to make filtering by looking at MAC addresses and protocol type of Ethernet frame. Normally switch works as follows: It looks at the destination MAC address of the incoming frame and tries to find it in its forwarding table. Switches keep <MAC, Port #> pairings in the forwarding table. If it finds the MAC address in the table then forwards the frame to the corresponding port. If it doesn't find the MAC address then it forwards the frame to all its ports except the one it is coming from. It also looks at the source address of the frame and if it is not in the table it enters the <MAC, Port #> pair in the forwarding table.
The switch used in the proposal looks additionally at the source or destination MAC address and protocol type of the frame and applies the rules entered by the administrator of the system. In the switch used here these rules state that no host on the network can answer the ARP requests except the ARPserver. 
ARP Implementation of Operating Systems

MAC Spoofing With Ettercap [13]
Ettercap is a sniffer but it is also a powerful and flexible tool for man-in-the-middle attacks. It supports active and passive dissection of many protocols (even chiphered ones) and it includes many features for network and host analysis. 
Design
Setup
In the proposed solution a layer-2 switch which has the capability of making decisions based on MAC address and protocol type constitutes the network infrastructure. All hosts are connected to this switch along with the host on which ARPserver application runs. Figure 6 shows the setup. The following filtering rules are applied to all ports of the switch except the port to which ARPserver host is connected.
If (a Frame is inbound) and The above pseudo code does the following:
All inbound frames (frames coming from the hosts to the switch) are checked. If the frame Ethernet protocol type is 0806 (ARP request/response frame) and source MAC address is the same as MAC address of the ARPserver host then the switch drops (does nothing about the frame) the frame. This rule guaranties that no host can spoof the MAC address of the ARPserver host.
All frames outbound (frames going from the switch to the hosts) are checked. If the protocol type is 0806 and source MAC address is not the same as MAC address of the ARPserver host then switch drops the frame. This rule guaranties that only ARPserver host can respond to ARP requests.
When these two rules are applied to switch, all ARP packets are destined to ARPserver host. Other hosts are prohibited from answering ARP request.
ARPserver
ARPserver application replies all ARP request packets broadcasted, besides checking for ARP attacks. It has a database of <IP, MAC> pairs. The problem is how to fill this database with all the active hosts' IP and MAC addresses.
a) The pairings can be learned by sending ICMP Echo request packets to all the hosts on the network in regular intervals. The length of interval may be determined by the rate of change of IP addresses and the rate of hosts attached or removed from the network. 
Figure 7 ARPserver Flow
ARPserver generally carries out the flow shown in Figure 7 . The algorithm applied in "Check IP, MAC, Spoofing" decision box is as follows: Figure 8 is prepared. 
